This paper examines the determinants of FDI employment restrictions. We construct a political economy model where the TNE and the government have different objective functions: the TNE maximizes profits, and the host government cares about tax revenue and local employment. We show that the level of employment preferred by the government exceeds the level preferred by the TNE -the divergence in preferences motivates the government to impose restrictions. We test the implications of the model using data on employment restrictions derived from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey, conducted in 1999/2000. The analysis employs data for up to 1207 foreign-owned firms operating in 52 countries.
Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is playing an increasingly prominent role in the world economy, especially in developing countries, where FDI has now become the main source of development capital. 1 While most countries have been offering assorted incentives (e.g., tax holidays) to attract more FDI, many countries continue to impose restrictions on FDI. These restrictions include the prohibition of FDI in certain industries, ceilings on the share of foreign equity (equity restrictions), controls on financial transactions between transnational enterprises (TNEs) and their local affiliates, minimum requirements for the use of local inputs, and restrictions on the employment of foreign personnel. Not surprisingly, both incentive and restrictive policies affect FDI flows [Clark (2000) , Taylor (2000) , and Asiedu and Lien (2002) ]. It is therefore important to understand the factors that determine incentive and restrictive investment policies. Surprisingly, research on this topic is scant. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study on the determinants of FDI policies, and the theoretical literature has mainly focused on analyzing tax holidays and equity restrictions.
2 Specifically, there is no systematic study on the reasons why governments intervene in the employment decisions of foreign owned firms. Indeed, there seems to be a dearth of research on the link between FDI and labor market regulations. 3 This is surprising because anecdotal evidence suggest that governments (in both developed and developing countries) often intervene in the employment and wage decisions of foreign-owned firms in ways that may significantly deter FDI. 4 For example, among the foreign-owned firms participating in the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES), 42 percent reported that labor regulations were a moderate or major problem to the operation and growth of their businesses. About the same percentage also reported that the government frequently intervened in their employment and wages decisions.
This paper fills the gap in the literature by examining the reasons why governments impose employment restrictions on FDI. We construct a political economy model of FDI policy where the preferences of the government and the TNE diverge and the government is motivated to intervene in the employment decisions of the TNE because it cares about the welfare of local workers as well as tax 1 Over the period 1991-2004, the share of FDI in total flows to developing countries increased from 24% to about 50%, while the share of official capital (loans and aid from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank) declined from 56% to 7% (World Bank, 2005) .
2 See Asiedu and Esfahani (2004) for a review of the theoretical literature on FDI restrictions.
3 Javorcik and Spatarenu (2004) conduct an extensive literature survey on the effect of labor market regulations on FDI and conclude that "the only empirical analysis of this question can be found in an unpublished paper by Dewit, Gorg and Monagna (2003) , which considers the impact of labor laws on FDI flows within the OECD countries."
revenues. We test the implications of our model using data on employment restrictions derived from the 1999/2000 WBES survey (see section 3 for a detailed description). Our analysis employs data on 1207
foreign-owned firms operating in 52 countries. We find that the likelihood that the host country will impose restrictions decreases with the government's ability to collect direct taxes, and increases with the extensiveness of the TNE's technological input to the FDI project, the importance of the contribution of local labor to the FDI project, the strength of the demand for the project output in the host country, the extent to which the institutions in the host country enhances the productivity of the project, the value politicians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers, and the wage premium for the employees of foreign owned firms.
Perhaps the most surprising result of the paper is that stronger institutions and more productive economic environment of a country are associated with greater employment intervention. In fact, this may seem counter-intuitive. However, the finding may be less puzzling when one notes that a key motivation of governments to maintain favorable business environments is to ensure better jobs and higher incomes for their citizens (which they can help maintain political support for the incumbent politicians). Once the institutional and physical public goods are made available to foreign investors, governments want to ensure that they share in the returns to those assets, either directly through taxation or indirectly through more remunerative jobs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model of FDI policy.
Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology and the data employed for the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
A Partial Equilibrium Model of FDI Employment Policy

The Setting
Consider a host country that has investment opportunities for foreign entrepreneurs operating through TNEs. For now, we focus on a single project that can produce a positive surplus in the host country if operated by a given TNE. Once established, the project produces q units of a product by means of managerial and technological input from the TNE, t, and local labor, l, Let the production function be constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas:
where a > 0 is a parameter that represents technology as well as country characteristics that enhance business operations and increase the productivity of projects at no cost to the firm -for example, public goods, especially effective institutions. 5 The parameter λ represents the importance of local labor in the project's operation, and it is higher when local labor has better and wider ranges of assets, such as higher education or technical abilities. 6 We assume that the TNE's assets are not contractible and, therefore, the TNE needs to own and operate the project in order to recover the returns to the use of its assets. The project is required to pay tax at a fixed rate, τ ∈ [0,1], on the net output. The same tax rate applies to labor income. 7 We assume that the labor market also has imperfections, but in that case, contracting problems only drive a wedge between the market price and the workers' reservation wage. 8 We treat the wage rate, w, as given and normalize the labor unit such that its reservation price (or opportunity costs) is equal to 1. Then, the wage premium is w − 1 > 0. For the output, we assume that the price, p, is exogenously given and that the market has no imperfection. A higher p indicates a stronger demand for the product.
A final simplifying assumption is that the TNE's input levels can take only two exogenous values; 0 and t > 0. If the level is set to zero, the project will not operate. Once the investment is done, the opportunity cost of using the positive levels of these inputs for the project is zero. These assumptions facilitate the analysis, but do not change the basic results concerning the government's motives to impose employment restrictions on the project.
We start the analysis by examining the labor input choice by the TNE when the government does not intervene in the project. We then examine the government's preferences over the labor input. We complete the analysis by modeling the government's decision to regulate.
The TNE's Preferred Level of Employment Input
The TNE maximizes its after-tax profits from the project, π T (l) which is given by:
5 Thus, we model a as a summary of country characteristics that enhance the productivity of the project and also exhibit the two characteristics of a public good, i.e., these factors are nontrivial and nonexclusive.
6 This idea can be formalized by specifying the production function as log q = ∫ index for a continuum of differentiated inputs required for the production of the output and x(s) is the quantity of input of variety s. The range of input varieties supplied local labor would then be the equivalent of λ, the share of labor's contribution to the production. The functional form in (2.1) provides a shortcut for the analysis with this specification. 7 The assumption that labor and profit income tax rates are the same is made to keep things simple. Allowing for differential taxation does not change the results of the paper. 8 This particularly notable in the case of employment in FDI projects, which typically pay higher wages and provide more training than domestic firms. See Asiedu (2004) for a review of the evidence.
Given that the TNE's reservation profit for engaging in the project is zero, it would invest and operate the project as long as π T ≥ 0. The first-order condition for maximizing π T with respect to l is:
The solution to (2.3), * T l , is the TNE's preferred level of employment in the project:
The politicians in charge of the host government may benefit from the project in two different ways. First, the project adds to the tax revenue, which the politicians value because they need funding for government activities that they control. The amount of this revenue is the total income tax delivered by the project, net of the expected taxes that the workers would have paid in their alternative jobs; that is, τpq − τl. Second, the surplus gained by the local workers, (1− τ)(w −1)l, helps improve welfare and adds to the political support for the ruling politicians. With these considerations, we specify the utility function of the politicians, expressed in terms of units of tax revenue, as:
where θ is the premium value that the politicians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers. We assume that (2.6) τ > θ(1− τ)(w −1);
i.e., the marginal value of a dollar of tax to the politicians exceeds their valuation of a dollar in the hands of workers. This is a reasonable assumption because if the government valued money more in the hands of worker than in the treasury, it could distribute its funds to them (rather than taxing labor income).
Maximizing u with respect to l yields the following first-order condition:
Note that assumption (2.6) implies that the coefficient of l on the right-hand side of (2.7) is positive and, therefore, (2.7) always has a solution, * G l , which is the employment level preferred by the government:
A quick examination of (2.8) shows that
The Government's FDI Policy
The divergence between the employment preferences of the TNE and the government creates a motive for policy intervention in the labor input decision of the project. The politicians' gain from intervening in employment and requiring the project to employ l is
l , where it is maximized. Although the government always prefers a higher level of employment than the TNE, it may refrain from imposing employment regulations on the TNE because that may entail costs that could exceed the benefits from the politicians' point of view. The costs consist of administrative effort as well as the risks of costly mistakes, which may depend on the project and country characteristics, but also contain idiosyncratic random elements for individual projects. The government chooses to intervene in a project's employment level if the maximum net benefit that it can obtain from such action is positive.
It is reasonable to assume that the intervention costs have a fixed part, ϕ, but also depend on the size of required adjustment in the project's employment, |l − * T l |. As a first-order approximation, we specify the intervention costs as ϕ − µ|l − * T l |, where µ is the marginal cost of intervention. Then, the politicians' net benefits from imposing employment level l , is
The government finds it worthwhile to intervene if
Given that ϕ and µ have random components, the probability that the government intervenes in a 
Note that (2.13) follows from the fact that π T (l)/(1−τ) = pq − wl is independent of τ and π T (l
In (2.14), we have used the fact that
The sign of ∂B/∂w is ambiguous because while an increase in w raises the politicians' gains from more employment at the project, at the same time it reduces * T l and makes it more costly for the government to push employment towards its preferred level, l * . Equation (2.18) can be derived by noting that ∂q/∂λ = q log(al/q), which is increasing in l and ensures that the first term on the right-hand side of (2.18) is positive. Thus the model generates the following hypothesis: All else equal, the likelihood that the government will impose employment restrictions increases with − the importance of the contribution of local labor to the FDI project, − the extensiveness of the TNE's technological input, − the extent to which the institutions in the host country enhances the productivity of the project, − the strength of the demand for the product, − the value politicians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers, and − the tax rate on income and wages.
Testable Implications of the Model
The impact of the wage premium is unclear.
Empirical Estimation
Brief Description of the Data on Employment Restrictions
The data for employment restrictions comes from the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES), conducted in 1999/2000. The aim of the survey was to identify the factors that constrain investment. The WBES database also has information on important firm attributes such as sales, assets, firm size, industry and ownership. The survey covered 10,032 firms in 81 countries. In general, at least about 100 firms were surveyed in each country. Within each country, at least 15 percent of the firms had foreign ownership, at least 15 percent were small (fewer than 50 employees) and at least 15 percent were large (more than 500 employees). The administration of WBES followed the regional structure of World Bank organization and, as a result, there may have been minor differences in the way some questions have been posed or the data has been collected in different regions. We address this issue in our estimation process (see below).
Our measure of employment restrictions is derived from the response by foreign owned firms to the question: corresponding to the six responses to each observation, so that a higher number implies more intervention.
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Data on the answer to Question 1 is available for a total of 8,548 firms of which 1,572 are foreign owned. Our empirical analysis employs data for up to 1207 foreign firms in 52 countries. We lost 365 observations because the data for some of the independent variables were missing for some countries.
These also happen to be mostly small countries where there are few observations (an average of less than 10 foreign-owned firms per country). 9 The original ordering of the answers is the reverse of the one shown in Question 1. We have re-ordered the answers to facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
Description of the Variables
We next describe the explanatory variables used in the estimations. The data for the country variables are averaged from 1995-99. Some of the explanatory variables are ordinal indices that in their original form take several values. To prevent those ordinal values from acting as cardinal measures, we recode all such variables in dichotomous forms by finding a gap in the distribution of the values and using it as a threshold above which our variable takes the value of 1, otherwise it is set equal to zero. The cutoff values and a summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 4 .We present the estimation results with both dichotomous and original coding and discuss their similarities and differences.
Determinants of Parameter λ: Contribution of Local Labor to the FDI Project
Education increases the scope and quality of skills that a country's labor force can offer, which in our model is associated with higher values of λ. To measure educational attainment, we use the average years of schooling in the population 25 years and older. We expect this variable, which we simply refer to as Education, to be positively related to the dependent variable, Employment Restriction.
The role of labor also varies by industry. In particular, jobs in the service sector are generally more labor intensive. We test this hypothesis by including a dummy variable, Service, for firms in the service industry. Then, all else equal, the estimated coefficients of Service should be positive.
Determinants of Parameter t: The Firm's Endowments
Larger firms tend to have more assets (technological, managerial, or financial) than smaller firms.
This raises t and, therefore, increases the likelihood of government intervention. We experimented with logs of sales and assets as measures of firm size. However, the data for these variables has many missing values and, besides, is quite noisy because respondents were asked to provide "estimates" of their sales and assets. For these reasons, we decided to use the only other measure of size available from the WBES, which is a simple indicator that categorizes firms as small (5 to 50 employees), medium (51 to 500 employees), and large (more than 500 employees). Although this variable is likely to be endogenous to employment restrictions, the broad categories reduce the severity of the problem. Besides, our model predicts a positive correlation between t and employment restrictions, whereas the bias caused by this endogeneity implies a negative effect. This means that the bias works against the model's prediction and, therefore, finding a positive effect would be a stronger confirmation of the hypothesis.
Determinants of Parameter a: Productivity-Enhancing Country Characteristics
The determinants of a include country characteristics that increase the productivity of projects.
This includes efficient institutions and effective business environment. We focus on five aspects of the host country's conditions that facilitate business operations-namely, rule of law, social and political stability, lack of corruption, economic openness, and economic growth.
Rule of law and social and political stability are important for business in general, and FDI operations in particular, because they lower the risk of arbitrary policies and, thus, increase the producers' confidence in the predictability of the business environment. For measuring these factors, we use two indicators, Rule of Law and Socio-Political Stability, which we derive from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset produced by the Political Risk Service, Inc. The Rule of Law is a measure of the impartiality of the legal system and the extent to which laws are enforced. We define Rule of Law as a dichotomous 0-1 measure that takes the value of 1 when the corresponding variable in the ICRG dataset averages above 5 out of 6 during 1995-1999. Socio-Political Stability is also defined dichotomously based on the sum of the ICRG scores for government stability, socioeconomic conditions, internal and military involvement in politics. All these scores are coded in a way that they should be rising in the extent of social and political stability, and their total is expected to be associated with higher values of a. When the total during 1995-1999 has an average equal or above 25 out of 48, Socio-Political Stability is set equal 1, otherwise it is 0 (see Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the components of Socio-Political Stability). We expect both of these variables to be positively related to Employment Restriction.
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As has been documented quite well in the literature, corruption has a negative impact on business.
11 To measure Corruption, we use another ICRG indicator and turn into a dichotomous index.
We expect the index's value of 1 to be associated with higher productivity (a) and, therefore, more
Employment Restriction.
Economic openness adds to the productivity of FDI projects because it provides firms with access to a greater variety of inputs and less hassle in accessing input and product markets. Finally, economic growth can be viewed as an indicator of all other factors that are not captured by the above variables, but play enabling roles in the business environment. It also acts as a source of growing demand for FDI projects, which makes it easier for firms to sell their products and expand their activities. In this role, growth rate can be seen as a determinant of p, which has a positive effect similar to a on Employment Restriction. For our purposes, the measure of economic growth is constant-price GDP growth rate from the WDI database.
Determinants of Parameter θ: Political Pressure for Employment Expansion
The weight of employment in the politicians' objective function partly depends on the ability of labor to organize and play a role in the political system. One measure of such ability is the index of 
Determinants of Parameter w − 1: The Wage Premium in FDI Projects
We do not have access to any direct measure of wage premium across countries. However, we use a proxy for labor market underdevelopment that is likely to be associated with higher wage premia.
The proxy is the share of agriculture in GDP available from WDI, which has typically been associated with less development in markets. For our purposes, share of agriculture in total employment is a good proxy. But, the available data for this variable is much more limited and substantially cuts the size of our sample. We do present the results of estimation with this variable, but for most regressions, we rely on the share of agriculture in GDP. We expect both variables to be positively related to Employment Restriction.
Determinants of Parameter τ: The Government's Ability to Collect Direct Taxes
Our model predicts that when the government has a greater ability to tax the surplus of an FDI project, it will have less interest in imposing employment restrictions. Since there are no direct measures of ability to tax, we use a combination of variables that may act as proxies. Two of our measures for this variable are the shares of property and social security and payroll taxes as percentages of total tax revenue. These types of tax, in contrast to international trade and sales taxes, require more effective bureaucracies and better information management. So, we posit that countries that manage to collect more of their taxes in these forms are likely to have greater potentials to tax FDI projects. The data for these variables is obtained from IMF's Government Finance Statistics. An alternative measure that we use for this purpose is the ordinal measure of Bureaucratic Quality available from ICRG data set. As in other ordinal measured, we turn this index into a 0-1 dummy variable to separate low and high bureaucratic capabilities. We expect all these measures to be negatively related to Employment Restriction.
The Econometric Model and Estimation
Our main econometric equation derived from the model in section 2 is an ordered LOGIT regression. The actual restrictiveness of employment policy is a latent variable, R * , which as a first approximation, we assume to be a linear function of the variables identified by the model as well as a random error term with a logistic distribution. [Assuming that the distribution is normal (i.e., an ordered PROBIT regression) does not change the results in any tangible way.] The observed responses to Question 1 are assumed to arise when R * fall into certain ranges. The ordered LOGIT method finds the cutoff points and the coefficients of the linear equation so as to maximize the likelihood of observing the actual questionnaire responses given the explanatory variables.
We start with a regression that includes the main variables representing the parameter of the model and then carry out sensitivity analysis by testing alternative measures and excluding observations based on different criteria. Besides the variables discussed above, we also included regional dummies in the regression to control for some unobserved effects, especially the possibility that the WBES questionnaire may have been administered or interpreted differently in different regions of the world. We used North America as the default region and tested dummies for other regions. The ones that proved significant were those for Western Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and transition countries.
Once these were included, dummies for other country categories such as OECD membership proved insignificant.
Empirical Results
Insert Tables 4-8. A key observation regarding estimation results is that they enjoy high statistical significance levels and agree with the hypotheses developed in earlier sections. As Table 5 show, the frequency of government intervention in employment decisions of foreign-owned firms rises with the educational attainment of the host country's labor force. This confirms our claim that when the local work force play a greater role in FDI projects, the government will become keener, and finds it less costly, to push for higher employment. Similarly, the negative effect of Corruption and the positive coefficients of Rule of Law, Socio-Political Stability, Share of Trade in GDP, Freedom of Trade, and GDP Growth all confirm the model's prediction that when a country's business environment is more productive, the government sees greater returns from asking foreign firms to expand their employment levels.
We should point out that we considered the log of GDP per capita as another possible measure of overall economic conditions. However, once institutional variables and regional dummies were included in the regression, GDP per capita showed no significance.
The dummies for Large Firm and Service Sector both prove to be generally significant in the regressions. This supports our claim that the project characteristics that make it more productive or more labor intensive tend to increase the government's gain from employment expansion and, therefore, make policy interventions more likely. We made an attempt to test the role of firm's assets by including the size of fixed asset estimate included in WBES dataset. However, the data are very rough estimates and, moreover, have many missing values. As a result, the estimates are not very reliable, though they carry the correct sign. (Those results are not presented here due to space limitations). A similar consideration and outcome applies to the value of firm sales available in the WBES dataset.
The above results, of course, hold for a given amount of surplus that the government can collect from each dollar of surplus produced by firms. When the government's taxation capability is high, then it has less interest in forcing foreign firms to employ more workers because such a policy could reduce its tax revenue. This effect is reflected in the negative coefficient of the Share of Social Security and Payroll Taxes in total tax revenue, which, as we argued, should be associated with the government's ability to tax.
This point is further confirmed in Table 6 , where alternative measures of taxation capability are used in the regression. As the first two columns of Table 6 show, using the Bureaucratic Quality dummy and the
Share of Property Taxes in total tax revenue both have negative effects on the likelihood of Employment
Restriction. Moreover, the last column of the table makes it clear that all these indicators may be complementary measures of ability to tax because when they enter the regression jointly, the fit of the regression improves and the significance levels of all three variables rise.
The regressions in Table 5 and 6 further show that economic openness and growth are positively related to Employment Restriction. This supports our claim that, controlling for the institutional quality and taxation, an economic environment that enhances productivity also motivates the government to demand more employment from foreign firms. This demand rises with the increase in political pressure from workers (measured by Union Independence) and with wage premium of workers in FDI projects.
The latter variable is captured in the share of agriculture in GDP in most of our regressions. However, the last column of Table 6 shows that share of agriculture in total employment yields a similar result, though using this variable entails a major reduction in the number of observations and countries included in the analysis.
The regional dummies included in the regressions indicate a negative effect for transition countries and positive ones for Western Europe, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. This may reflect some characteristics of those regions not captured by our explanatory variables. However, they could also be due differences in the way data has been collected in different regions.
For further sensitivity analysis, we first added the percent of foreign ownership to our main regressions in Table 5 . The first column of Table 7 shows the results of that experiment with LOGIT method. (PROBIT results are very similar.) The foreign share seems to be negatively related to Employment Restriction, but its significance level is marginal. To examine whether our results may be driven by the extent of foreign ownership, we re-estimated the main model with the sample of firms that had more than 50 percent foreign ownership. As the second column of Table 7 confirms, the results remain essentially unchanged. Experiments with sample of firms that have larger foreign shares (not shown here) do not change the basic message, though the sample size suffers.
Another sensitivity test was to drop countries with outlying or small numbers of firms in the main sample. For all countries in the sample other than Thailand, number of observations varies from 8 to 57, with a median of 25. Thailand has 124 observations and may be dominating the sample. For this reason, we ran our regressions after omitting Thailand from the sample. The third column of Table 7 shows the result, which is the same model specification as the first column of Table 5 , but with Thailand omitted from the sample. The only noticeable changes in the magnitude of coefficients are those of regional dummies and the social security and payroll tax share. However, the signs remain unchanged and significance levels are somewhat lower in the smaller sample. A similar observation applies to the case where we drop the eleven countries that have less than 12 observations. (See the last column of Table 7) A final sensitivity test of our estimates is the use of the full categorization data for the ordinal measures included in the regressions. Table 8 shows the results of re-estimating the regressions of Table 5 with the ordinal measure. Here the changes are more substantial for some variables (in particular, Rule of Law and Freedom of Trade indicators lose their significance). However, this is likely to reflect the problems of treating ordinal measures as cardinal ones. Nevertheless, it is important to note that for all other variables, the signs and even the significance levels are preserved in the experiment, alleviating concerns that the formation of dichotomous measures may be driving the results.
Conclusion
This paper has theoretically and empirically examined the determinants of employment restrictions on FDI. We find that the likelihood that the host country will impose restrictions decreases with the government's ability to collect direct taxes, and increases with the extensiveness of the TNE's technological input to the FDI project, the importance of the contribution of local labor to the FDI project, the strength of the demand for the project output in the host country, the extent to which the institutions in the host country enhances the productivity of the project, the value politicians place on each unit of surplus earned by workers, and the wage premium for the employees of foreign owned firms.
The result that countries with better institutions tend to be more restrictive seems counterintuitive. However, it reflects the fact that one of the key motivations of governments to maintain favorable business environments is to ensure better jobs and higher incomes for their citizens (which they can help maintain political support for the incumbent politicians). Once the institutional and physical public goods are made available to foreign investors, governments want to ensure that they share in the returns to those assets, either directly through taxation or indirectly through more remunerative jobs.
This paper is a first step in understanding the roles played by the political and institutional characteristics of the host country in the formation of FDI policies. 12 Specifically, our analysis places FDI policies into an appropriate context by identifying clear rationales for government interventions. 13 Such an analysis has important policy implications because devising successful and credible policies requires an understanding of the forces that govern policymaking. Thus, identifying the factors that drive countries to impose employment restrictions on FDI will help technical analysts (such as officials of the World Bank) to devise alternative and less costly ways via which governments can achieve their objectives.
We end by pointing out one caveat of our model: it focuses on only one type of FDI restrictive policy. We note however that governments typically employ several policies and that FDI policies are in general interdependent. A natural extension will be to expand the model to include other types of FDI (restrictive and incentive) policies. Such an analysis will permit one to examine several issues that are important in the policy arena.
12 The effect of institutions and politics on policy formation has received a lot of attention in other areas of economics, but not in FDI. 13 In the literature, FDI policies are often treated as ad hoc (and typically inefficient) government actions. 
